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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the design of a new secrecy transmission scheme for a four-node relay-eavesdropper
channel. The key idea of the proposed scheme is to combine noisy network coding with the interference assisted
strategy for wiretap channel with a helping interferer. A new achievable secrecy rate is characterized for both
discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels. Such a new rate can be viewed as a general framework, where the
existing interference assisted schemes such as noisy-forwarding and cooperative jamming approaches can be shown
as special cases of the proposed scheme. In addition, under some channel condition where the existing schemes
can only achieve zero secrecy rate, the proposed secrecy scheme can still offer significant performance gains.
Index Terms
Relay-eavesdropper channel, information theoretic secrecy, noisy network coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation and secrecy are two important concepts which have been widely studied in wireless
communications. Due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, wireless transmissions can be over-
heard by multiple unintended receivers. Such broadcasting nature facilitates cooperation by allowing
neighbor users to intelligently exploit the over-heard information but also leads to a serious security
problem such as eavesdropper attacking.
Wyner studied the eavesdropping attack from an information theoretic aspect by introducing the concept
of wire-tap channel in [1]. Under the assumption that the wiretapper channel (source-to-wiretapper) is
a degraded version of the main channel (source-to-destination), the secrecy capacity was established
based on the rate-equivocation region concept. Csiza´r and Ko¨rner extended this degraded channel to the
general wiretapper channel setup without any special assumptions, and found the secrecy capacity in [2].
Recently, more types of multiuser networks have been studied in the context of secrecy communications.
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2The multiple access wiretapper channel (MAC-WT) is considered in [3], [4], where an external passive
wiretapper was included. The multiple access channel with confidential messages (MAC-CM) is studied in
[5], [6], where the source terminals act as eavesdroppers to each other. The works in [7], [8] investigate the
broadcast channel with confidential messages (BC-CM) where both receivers wish to keep their message
secret from the others. Similarly, [7], [9] considered the interference channel (IC), where the former treated
each unintended receiver as an eavesdropper and the latter introduced an external eavesdropper.
To further enhance the secrecy level in the above mentioned channel models, user cooperation has been
considered in [4], [7], [10]–[17], where [10]–[14] consider the untrusted helper scenario in which the relay
node acts both a helper and an eavesdropper, and [4], [7], [15]–[17] consider cooperative communication
systems with an external eavesdropper. Particularly for the latter scenario with a dedicated relay, such
as the work in [4], [15], [16] where the relay does not have its own message to be sent or received,
so-called interference-assisted schemes that involve cooperative jamming [4] and noisy forward (NF) [15]
techniques have been proved to be particularly useful to increase secrecy. The basic idea of these strategies
is to allow the relay to send codewords (or even pure noisy) which are independent to the source message
in order to confuse the eavesdropper. The work in [16] can be viewed as a generalization of this type of
interference strategies for a wiretap channel with a helping interferer (WT-HI). On the other hand, [15]
extended some classical relaying schemes for relay channels (such as Cover and El Gamal’s decode-and-
forward (DF) and compress-and-forward (CF) schemes [18]) to strength the main channel. It has been well
known that, in comparison with DF, CF with independent coding at the relay is more suitable for a general
scenario without a strong source-relay link. However, for the CF scheme in [15], its lower bound on the
equivocation rate is the same as the NF scheme. That is to say, the source information forwarded from
the relay to the destination was shown in [15] not helpful to this four-node relay-eavesdropper channel
compared to interference-assisted schemes.
In this paper, we consider the four-node secrecy communication scenario with a source, a relay, a
destination and an eavesdropper. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that an effective use of the relay
for source information forwarding can yield a larger achievable secrecy rate than the interference assisted
schemes, whereas the existing relay secrecy protocol in [15] can only achieve the same performance as
the interference assisted ones. The key idea of our achievable scheme is to combine noisy network coding
(NNC) [19] for relay channels with the interference-assisted scheme [16] for WT-HI. The proposed scheme
is mainly facilitated by the fact that NNC can be used as an efficient tool to analyze the achievable rates
of a large scale network, which is particularly useful for the addressed four-node secrecy network. But
slightly different to decoding in [19], which did not involve uniquely decoding the relay message, we
discuss how to decode the relay messages at the eavesdropper when the equivocation rate is commutated.
3As a result, we can obtain a larger achievable secrecy rate with more explicit expressions if compared to
the traditional CF scheme in [15]. Furthermore, following stochastic encoding in [1], [2], random dummy
information has been blended into the encoding procedure at the both source and relay, which ensures an
effective application of NNC in secrecy communications.
After the achievable rate of the proposed scheme is obtained, it is shown that the interference-assisted
scheme in [16] can be viewed as a special case of our proposed scheme when we ask the relay only to
send information not related to the source message. When the relay-destination link is strong, we will
show that the proposed scheme can exploit the capability of the dedicated relay node more effectively.
That is to say, in this case, the relay can strength the condition of the main channel and suppress the
wiretapper channel at the same time. It is interesting to observe that for some very strong eavesdropping
cases, the proposed scheme can still achieve a positive secrecy rate, while the achievable secrecy rate
of the scheme in [16] is zero. To further visualize the impact of our achievable cooperative scheme
on secrecy, we extend the achievable secrecy rate to the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel based on
Gaussian codebooks. Fixed power control is first used to obtain an explicit expression of the achievable
rate, and the impact of power control on the secrecy rate is investigated by using computer simulations.
Particularly the provided numerical results demonstrate that the use of power control can yield more
performance gains for the proposed scheme compared to the scheme in [16]. For example, in the case
of very strong eavesdropping to which the scheme in [16] can only achieve zero secrecy rate, a positive
secrecy rate can be achieved with a moderate requirement of the relay-destination channel condition.
The reminder of the paper is organized as following. Section II describes the channel model of the
addressed relay-eavesdropper scenario. Section III states the achievable rate of the proposed secrecy
transmission protocol, and some remarks by comparing the obtained rate to existing ones. Section IV
provides the extension of the secrecy rate to the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel, where the impact
of the power control will also be discussed. Conclusions are given in Section V. Proofs are collected in
Appendix. Throughout this paper, (x)+ denotes max(0, x). A sequence of random variables with time index
i ∈ [1 : n] := {1, · · · , n} is denoted as Xn := {X1, · · · , Xn}. And X]i[ := {Xj, 1 ≤ j < i or i < j ≤ n}.
II. THE RELAY-EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
Consider a discrete memoryless relay-eavesdropper channel with a source (X1), a dedicated relay
(Yr, X2), a destination (Y1) and a passive eavesdropper (Y2). This communication model consists of two
finite input alphabets X1, X2 at the source and relay respectively, three output alphabets Yr, Y1, Y2
at the relay, destination and eavesdropper respectively, and a channel transition probability distribution
p(yr, y1, y2|x1, x2) where xt ∈ Xt, yt ∈ Yt (t = 1, 2) and yr ∈ Yr. The source wishes to send a
confidential message W1 to the destination with the help of the dedicated relay, while keeping it secret
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Fig. 1. The relay eavesdropper channel.
from the eavesdropper which knows the codebooks of the source and relay. We refer to such a cooperative
communication model as the relay-eavesdropper channel, as shown in Fig. 1.
The source intends to send a confidential message W1 ∈ {1, · · · ,M} to the destination in n channel
uses. The memoryless assumption is imposed in the sense that at the i-th channel use the channels outputs
(yr,i, y1,i, y2,i) only depend on the channel inputs (x1,i, x2,i). A stochastic encoder for the source is specified
by a matrix of conditional probabilities f1(x1,i|w1), where x1,i ∈ X1, w1 ∈ W1 and
∑
x1,i∈X1
f1(x1,i|w1) =
1 for all i = 1, · · · , n. The encoder at the relay maps the signals (yr,1, yr,2, · · · , yr,i−1) received before
the i-th channel use to its output x2,i, using another stochastic encoder f2, which is described by a
matrix of conditional probabilities f2(x2,i|yi−1r , xi−12 ), where x2,k ∈ X2, (k = 1, · · · , i), yr,k ∈ Yr, (k =
1, · · · , i − 1) and ∑x2,i∈X2 f2(x2,i|yi−1r , xi−12 ) = 1. The decoding function at the destination is described
by a deterministic mapping φ: Yn1 →W1. The average error probability of a (M,n) code is
P (n)e =
1
M
M∑
w1=1
Pr{φ(Y n1 ) 6= w1|w1 was sent}. (1)
The secrecy level at the eavesdropper is measured with respect to the equivocation rate 1
n
H(W1|Y n2 ).
A secrecy rate Rs is said to be achievable for the relay-eavesdropper channel if for any ǫ > 0 there exists
a sequence of codes (M,n) such that
M ≥ 2nRs , P (n)e ≤ ǫ, and
Rs − ǫ ≤ 1
n
H(W1|Y n2 ) (2)
for sufficiently large n.
III. AN ACHIEVABLE SCHEME
In this section we will present an achievable scheme for the relay-eavesdropper channel, which combines
the NNC scheme for relay channel [19], the random binning scheme for wiretap channels [1], [2], and
the interference assisted scheme for WT-HI [16]. As shown at the end of this section, the achievable rate
obtained in [16] can be viewed as a special case of the results obtained in this paper, by asking the relay
5to ignore the over-heard source information and only to transmit dummy messages. The equivocation rate
achieved by the proposed secrecy scheme is given in the following subsection.
A. Achievable secrecy rate
Prior to the discussions of the achievable rate, we first give some definitions as:
I1 = I(Yˆr; Yr|X2),
I
(t)
2 = I(X1, X2; Yt) + I
(
Yˆr;X1, Yt|X2
)
, (3)
where (t = 1, 2), and R(t)1 is defined as a function of R2 as
R
(t)
1 (R2) = max
{
min
[
I
(
X1; Yˆr, Yt|X2
)
, I
(t)
2 − R2
]
, I(X1; Yt)
}
. (4)
Then our achievable secrecy rate is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The achievable secrecy rate Rs for the addressed relay-eavesdropper channel is
Rs = max
π,R2≥I1
[
R
(1)
1 (R2)− R(2)1 (R2)
]+
, (5)
where π denotes the class of distributions
p(x1)p(x2)p(yr, y1, y2|x1, x2)p(yˆr|yr, x2).
Proof: refer to Appendix A.
To achieve the secrecy rate given in Theorem 1, the source and the relay cooperate with each other
based on the idea of the NNC scheme, and the necessary randomness will be blended into the codebooks at
both two transmitters in order to increase the secrecy level. Roughly speaking, a message is first generated
at the source by mixing the confidential message with a random dummy message, where the redundant
dummy part provides randomization in order to ensure the confidential part transmitted under the secrecy
constraint. Then the source encodes this mixed message and sends it multiple times in multiple blocks
using independent codebooks, which is different to the classical CF scheme in which a source message
is first divided into multiple segments and then transmitted over multiple blocks. Meanwhile, at each
block, the relay uses the NNC strategy without Wyner-Ziv binning to send the quantized observations
obtained from the previous block. For many existing works, such as [15], the relay observations are first
compressed and then random binning is used to insert randomness into the system, where the two steps
are performed over two separate stages. A key idea of the proposed secrecy scheme is to treat the size of
the relay codebook as a parameter, where the dummy message is generated at the same time when the
source message is compressed at the relay, and the amount of randomness injected into the system can
be easily adjusted by changing this parameter.
6For decoding, the destination performs either special “joint” decoding according to NNC or simple
separated decoding by ignoring the relay message. Specifically, when such “joint” decoding is performed,
the destination utilizes the observations from the both source and relay, and simultaneously decodes the
received signals from all the blocks without decoding the compression indices. Separate decoding simply
aims to decode the source message by treating the signals transmitted by the relay as pure noise. Some
remarks of the achievable scheme are given as follows.
Remark 1: In Theorem 1, the first factor of R(1)1 (R2), min
[
I
(
X1; Yˆr, Y1|X2
)
, I
(1)
2 − R2
]
, can be
viewed as a special case of the NNC achievable rate for the classical relay channel without security
constraints [19]; R(2)1 (R2) denotes the redundancy rate sacrificed at the source, in order to protect the
confidential message and confuse the eavesdropper; R2 denotes the data rate at the relay. Furthermore,
for the rate R(1)1 (R2) given in (4), the first term in the max function, min
[
I
(
X1; Yˆr, Y1|X2
)
, I
(1)
2 −R2
]
,
achieved by using the “joint” decoding strategy according to NNC; on the other hand, the second term,
I(X1; Y1), is achieved by using the separate decoding strategy.
Remark 2: The separate decoding strategy at the destination corresponds to the cooperative jamming
scheme in which the relay rate R2 is so large that both the destination and eavesdropper cannot extract
any source information from the relay transmissions. This cooperative jamming is applied to the case
that the relay-eavesdropper link is stronger than the relay-destination link, then the relay can hurts the
eavesdropper more even though it attacks the destination. Note that this is different to the work in [19]
for classical relay channel without secrecy constraint, which ignores the separate decoding and only needs
to simply set R2 to larger than but arbitrarily close to I1.
Remark 3: As shown in the next subsection, the proposed relay scheme can achieve better performance
than the interference assisted scheme in [16] which in turn has been recognized to realize better
performance than the relay scheme [15]. Direct comparison between the two relay schemes is difficult due
to the complicated expressions of two achievable rates. The reason for such a performance improvement
is due to the use of NNC, where NNC is ideal for the analysis of large scale networks and therefore can
facilitate the calculation of a better equivocation rate.
B. Special cases
In this subsection, we will present several special cases to show the superiority of the proposed
achievable scheme in comparison with the interference assisted schemes in [15], [16].
1) Disable the channel output Yr: If we disable the received signal Yr at the relay by setting Yˆr = Ø,
the channel model reduces to WT-HI in [16], and the achievable rate becomes
Rs,[HI] = max
p(x1)p(x2),R2≥0
{
R
(1)
1,[HI](R2)− R(2)1,[HI](R2)
}
7where R(t)1,[HI](R2) = max{min[I(X1; Yt|X2), I(X1X2; Yt)−R2], I(X1; Yt) with t = 1, 2. So the achievable
equivocation of the proposed scheme would be at least as good as the one in [16] in any case.
2) Very strong eavesdropping: Following [16], we define this case as
I(X1; Y2) ≥ I(X1; Y1|X2)
for all distributions of p(x1)p(x2)p(yˆr|yr, x2). For such very strong eavesdropping as shown in Fig. 2,
the helping interferer scheme in [16] cannot achieve a positive secrecy rate as given in Eq. (14) of [16].
However, the secrecy rate of the proposed scheme can be lower bounded as
Rs,lb = max
π


min


I(X1; Yˆr, Y1|X2)− I(X1; Y2),
I
(1)
2 − I(2)2 ,
I(X1, X2; Y1)− I(Yˆr; Yr|X1, X2, Y1)− I(X1; Y2)




+
(6)
where the lower bound on the right side is obtained by choosing R2 = R∗2 with R∗2 =
max{I1, I(X2; Y2|X1) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2)}. From Fig. 2, one can see that a non-zero secrecy rate Rs
can still be achievable in this case. This is because the use of the relay can strengthen the main link and
suppress the wiretapper link at the same time.
3) Extremely strong eavesdropping: This case is referred to
I(X1; Y2) ≥ min
{
I(X1; Yˆr, Y1|X2), I(X1, X2; Y1)− I(Yˆr; Yr|X1, X2, Y1)
}
for all product distributions of p(x1)p(x2)p(yˆr|yr, x2), where the term at the right side of the above equality
is from (4) by setting R2 = I1. The proposed scheme cannot achieve any positive secrecy rate, the same
as the scheme in [16].
Note that the use of the channel prefixing technique in [2] may further enhance the performance of
the proposed scheme, but we do not consider this prefixing method in this paper due to the intractable
evaluation of its performance.
IV. GAUSSIAN RELAY-EAVESDROPPER CHANNEL
In this section, a discrete memoryless Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel is considered, where the
channel outputs at the destination, eavesdropper, relay can be expressed as [16]
Y1 = X1 +
√
bX2 + Z1,
Y2 =
√
aX1 +X2 + Z2,
Yr =
√
cX1 + Zr, (7)
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Fig. 2. Illustrations of the functions R(1)1 (R2) and R
(2)
1 (R2) versus relay rate R2(≥ I1) for the very strong eavesdropping case
(i.e. I(X1; Y1|X2) ≤ I(X1;Y2)), where I3 = I(X2;Y2|X1) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2), R∗2 = max{I1, I3}. Case i, ii, iii denotes
Rs,lb = I(X1; Yˆr, Y1|X2)− I(X1;Y2), I
(1)
2 − I
(2)
2 , I(X1, X2; Y1)− I(Yˆr;Yr|X1, X2, Y1)− I(X1;Y2) in (6), respectively.
where Z1, Z2, Zr are i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian random variables with unit variance. a, b, c are channels
gains. The transmit power of the channel inputs X1 and X2 are constrained by
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X21,i] ≤ P¯1,
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[X22,i] ≤ P¯2. (8)
A. Achievable secrecy rate
Applying Theorem 1 to the Gaussian case given by (7), the following theorem can be obtained.
Theorem 2: For a Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel, when fixing the transmit powers at the source
and relay as 0 ≤ P1 ≤ P¯1 and 0 ≤ P2 ≤ P¯1, the following secrecy rate is achievable
Rs(P1, P2) = max{RIs(P1, P2), RIIs (P1)} (9)
where RIs(P1, P2) is
RIs(P1, P2) =


C
(
P1 +
bcP1P2
1+(1+c)P1+bP2
)
− C
(
aP1
1+P2
)
, if b ≥ 1 + (1 + c)P1
C (P1 + bP2)− C (aP1 + P2) , if 1 ≤ b < 1 + (1 + c)P1
C
(
P1
1+bP2
)
− C
(
aP1
1+P2
)
, if b < 1
(10)
9and RIIs (P1) = [C(P1)− C(aP1)]+ with C(x) = 12 log(1 + x).
Proof: refer to Appendix C.
Remark 4: When b ≤ 1 + P1, the achievable secrecy tare in Theorem 2 is the same as the one in
Theorem 3 of [16]. However, when b > 1 + P1, it can be easily proved that the proposed scheme strictly
outperforms the latter one. This is mainly because, when the relay-destination channel is sufficiently strong,
the main channel becomes a bottleneck for the interference assisted scheme without relaying the source
message, whereas the proposed scheme can efficiently improve the main link by relaying the quantized
source message.
Remark 5: For the Gaussian relay-eavesdropper channel, power control can be used to further enhance
the achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 2. Under certain conditions, the secrecy rate is not necessarily
maximized at P1 = P¯1 and P2 = P¯2. Loosely speaking, in some situations, larger source power P1 and
relay power P2 may enhance the eavesdropper’s decoding capability more, or bring more interferences to
the destination. Or in other words, the maximum power transmission does not always result in a larger
equivocation rate. Then power control can play an important role for secrecy transmission and change the
achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 2 into
Rs = max
0≤P1≤P¯1,0≤P2≤P¯2
RIs(P1, P2),
where RIIs is redundant and can be ignored when power control is applied since it can be viewed as a
special case of RIs by setting P2 = 0. Following those steps in Appendix D of [16], the optimal solution
of power control can be obtained. Due to the space limit, we will only rely on the computer simulations
in this paper to show the performance of the proposed scheme with power control as shown in the next
numerical sections.
B. Numerical results
In Fig. 3, the achievable secrecy rates for the proposed scheme are shown as a function of the relay-
destination channel gain b. We set the source-eavesdropper channel gain as a = 1 or a = 6 respectively,
the capacity of the eavesdropper channel without the relay is zero. The interference assisted scheme in [16]
and the upper bound obtained in Theorem 1 of [15] have also been shown in the figures for comparison.
Interestingly, one can see that the performance of the proposed scheme is the same as the one in [16] for
b ≤ 1 and outperforms it when b > 1. Such a performance gain can be further enlarged for a large a as
a = 6, which is the very strong case as discussed above. It means that the proposed scheme obtains more
helps from the power control compared to the scheme in [16], where the use of power control makes
it more likely that the proposed scheme outperforms the comparable one in [16], even with moderate
channel conditions. As can be seen from the Theorem 2, the condition to ensure that the proposed scheme
10
achieves a better performance than the comparable one is b > 1 + P1. By applying power control, the
value of the source transmission power P1 is not necessarily to be the maximum P¯1, which brings the
benefit that the requirement to the relay-destination channel gain b is reduced.
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Fig. 3. Achievable secrecy rate for different schemes for a relay channel versus b (the relay destination channel gain), where c = 0.8 and
the power bounds are P¯1 = P¯2 = 5.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have focused on the four-node relay-eavesdropper channel, and developed a new form
of the achievable secrecy rate for such a scenario. The key idea of the proposed scheme is to combine
noisy network coding with the interference assisted strategy for wiretap channel with a helping interferer.
Facilitated by these techniques, the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed scheme was characterized for
both discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels. Such a new rate can be viewed as a general framework,
where the existing interference assisted schemes such as noisy-forwarding and cooperative jamming
approaches can be shown as special cases of the proposed scheme. In addition, under some channel
condition where the existing schemes can only achieve zero secrecy rate, analytic and numerical results
have been provided to show that the proposed secrecy scheme can still offer significant performance
gains. The impact of power control on the secrecy rate has only been analyzed by relying on computer
simulations, where a promising future direction is to carry out the study for the optimal design of power
control and allocation for the addressed relay-eavesdropper scenario.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Codebook Generation: Fix p(x1)p(x2)p(yˆr|yr, x2). A codebook for each block is randomly and
independently generated. Let x1j = (x1,(j−1)n+1, · · ·x1,jn), j ∈ [1 : B]. So are the definitions of x2j ,
11
y1j , y2j , yrj, yˆrj .
For each j ∈ [1 : B], randomly generate 2nBR1 n-sequences x1j , each according to the distribution∏n
i=1 pX1(x1,(j−1)n+i). These 2nBR1 codewords are then randomly grouped into 2nBR1,s bins each with
2nBR1,o codewords1, R1 = R1,s + R1,o. Index them as x1j(w1, w′1), w1 ∈ [1 : 2nBR1,s ], w′1 ∈ [1 : 2nBR1,o ].
Then randomly generate 2nR2 n-sequences x2j(lj−1), lj−1 ∈ [1 : 2nR2] (l0 = 1), each according to∏n
i=1 pX2(x2,(j−1)n+i). For each x2j(lj−1), randomly generate 2nR2 n-sequences yˆrj(lj|lj−1), lj ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ],
each according to
∏n
i=1 pYˆr |X2(yˆr,(j−1)n+i|x2,(j−1)n+i(lj−1)).
Hence the codebook is defined as
Cj = {x1j(w1, w′1),x2j(lj−1), yˆrj(lj |lj−1) :
w1 ∈ [1 : 2nBR1,s ], w′1 ∈ [1 : 2nBR1,o ], lj ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ]}
for j ∈ [1 : B], (l0 = 1). Besides, set the rates for R1 and R2 as
R2 > I1 + δ(ǫ
′), (11)
R1 < max
{
min
[
I
(
X1; Yˆr, Y1|X2
)
, I
(1)
2 − R2
]
, I(X1; Y1)
}
where I1 and I(2)2 are defined in (3), δ(ǫ′ → 0) as ǫ′ → 0.
Encoding: The encoding processes at the source and relay are shown as follows:
• To send the confidential w1 ∈ [1 : 2nBR1,s ], the source randomly chooses a dummy message w′1 ∈ [1 :
2nBR1,o ] and then sends x1j(w1, w′1) at block j. Meanwhile, the relay transmits x2j(lj−1) in block j.
• The relay, upon the received sequence yrj at the end of block j, finds an index lj such that
(yˆrj(lj |lj−1),yrj,x2j(lj−1)) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ . If there exists more than one such qualified index, uniformly
select one of them at random. Besides, if there doesn’t exist such an index, randomly choose an
arbitrary index from [1 : 2nR2 ].
Decoding: Let ǫ > ǫ′. At the end of block B, the destination declares that wˆ1 is received if
1) (“joint” decoding of NNC) x1j(wˆ1, wˆ′1) is the only codeword such that
(x1j(wˆ1, wˆ
′
1),x2j(lˆj−1), yˆrj(lˆj|lˆj−1),y1j) ∈ T (n)ǫ for all j ∈ [1 : B] for some lˆ1, · · · lˆB; or
2) (separate decoding) x1j(wˆ1, wˆ′1) is the only codeword such that (x1j(wˆ1, wˆ′1),y1j) ∈ T (n)ǫ for all
j ∈ [1 : B].
The destination makes an error if neither 1) nor 2) occurs, or if there exists more than one such wˆ1-index.
For any rate pair (R1, R2) given in (11), we have R1 < min
[
I
(
X1; Yˆr, Y1|X2
)
, I
(1)
2 − R2
]
or R1 <
I(X1; Y1), which is subjected to the constraint in Section III of [19] or the constraint of separate decoding.
Therefore, the intended receiver can decode W1 with an arbitrarily small probability of error using either
1Note that the parameters R1, R1,o correspond to R(1)1 (R2) and R
(2)
1 (R2) in (4), respectively
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the “joint” decoding strategy according to NNC or the separate decoding way, as long as n and B are
sufficiently large.
Equivocation Computation: The parameter R1,o is different for each of two cases (i.e. Case I and
Case II) depending on the code rate R2 at the relay. From (4) and the perspective of the eavesdropper,
in Case I, let2 I1 < R2 < I(X2; Y2|X1) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2), which corresponds to the situation
R
(2)
1 = min
[
I
(
X1; Yˆr, Y2|X2
)
, I
(2)
2 − R2
]
; in Case II, let R2 ≥ I(X2; Y2|X1) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2), which
corresponds to the situation R(2)1 = I(X1; Y2). Now the equivocation will be lower bounded according to
the R2 value as two following subsections.
A. Case I:
(
I1 < R2 ≤ I(X2; Y2|X1) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2)
)
Set the rate parameter for R1,o as
R1,o = min{I(X1; Yˆr, Y2|X2), I(2)2 − R2} − ǫ1. (12)
In the following analysis, Xn1j denotes (X1,(j−1)n+1, · · · , X1,jn), j ∈ [1 : B], then XBn1 =
(X1,1, · · · , X1,Bn) = (Xn11, · · · , Xn1B), and Xn1,]j[ denotes the set {Xn1k, 1 ≤ k < j or j < k ≤ n}.
So are the definitions with respect to the other variables such as X2, Y2, Yˆr. The equivocation at the
eavesdropper is lower bounded as
H(W1|Y Bn2 ) ≥ H(W1|Y Bn2 , LB)
= H(W1, Y
Bn
2 |LB)−H(Y Bn2 |LB)
= H(W1, X
Bn
1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r , Y
Bn
2 |LB)
−H(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr |W1, Y Bn2 , LB)−H(Y Bn2 |LB)
= H(XBn1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r |LB) +H(W1, Y Bn2 |XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr , LB)
−H(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr |W1, Y Bn2 , LB)−H(Y Bn2 |LB)
≥ H(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr )−H(LB) +H(Y Bn2 |XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr )
−H(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr |W1, Y Bn2 , LB)−H(Y Bn2 )
= H(XBn1 )−H(LB) +H(XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr )− I(XBn1 ;XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr )
−I(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr ; Y Bn2 )−H(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr |W1, Y Bn2 , LB) (13)
Now let’s calculate the six terms separately in the following subsections.
1) The first and the second term:
H(XBn1 ) = nBR1 = nB(R1,s +R1,o)
H(LB) ≤ log 2nR2 = nR2, (14)
2Note that if I1 ≥ I(X2;Y2|X1) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2), Case I does not exist, and we only need to consider Case II.
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2) The third term: Since a block Markov encoding is used, and L1−L2−· · ·−LB is a Markov chain.
So it can be calculated that
H(XBn2 , Yˆ
Bn
r ) = H(L1, L2, · · ·LB)
=
B∑
j=1
H(Lj|L1, · · · , Lj−1)
=
B∑
j=1
H(Lj|Lj−1), (15)
In order to obtain the lower bound of H(LB|LB−1), let’s first present a lemma as following.
Lemma 1: For any j ∈ [1 : B] and lj−1, lj ∈ [1 : 2nR2], let p(lj |lj−1) denote pLj |Lj−1(lj |lj−1) for
simplicity, the conditional probability mass function p(lj|lj−1) can be upper bounded as
p(lj|lj−1) ≤ 2−n(R2−2δ(ǫ′))
(
2
1− ǫ′ + exp
{
−
(
(1− ǫ′)2n(R2−I1−δ(ǫ′))−3 − n(R2 − 2δ(ǫ′)) ln 2
)})
. (16)
Proof: refer to Appendix B.
Therefore, by using the above lemma, H(Lj|Lj−1) can be bounded as
H(Lj|Lj−1) =
2nR2∑
lj−1=1
2nR2∑
lj=1
p(lj , lj−1) log p
−1(lj|lj−1)
≥
(
log 2n(R2−2δ(ǫ
′)) − nδ1(n)
) 2nR2∑
lj−1=1
2nR2∑
lj=1
p(lj , lj−1)
= nR2 − n(2δ(ǫ′) + δ1(n)), (17)
where δ1(n) = 1n log
(
2
1−ǫ′
+ exp
{− ((1− ǫ′)2n(R2−I1−δ(ǫ′))−3 − n(R2 − 2δ(ǫ′)) ln 2)}) → 0 as n → ∞
since R2 has been constrained in (11). Recalling (15), we can obtain
H(XBn2 , Yˆ
Bn
r ) ≥ nBR2 − nB(2δ(ǫ′) + δ1(n)). (18)
3) The fourth and fifth terms: The fourth term in (15) can be upper bounded as:
I(XBn1 ;X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r ) =
B∑
j=1
I(XBn1 ;X
n
2j, Yˆ
n
rj|X(j−1)n2 , Yˆ (j−1)nr )
=
B∑
j=1
{I(XBn1 ; Yˆ nrj|Xn2j , X(j−1)n2 , Yˆ (j−1)nr ) + I(XBn1 ;Xn2j |X(j−1)n2 , Yˆ (j−1)nr )} (19)
(a)
≤
B∑
j=1
{H(Yˆ nrj|Xn2j)−H(Yˆ nrj|XBn1 , Xn2j, X(j−1)n2 , Yˆ (j−1)nr )}
(b)
=
B∑
j=1
{H(Yˆ nrj|Xn2j)−H(Yˆ nrj|Xn1j, Xn2j)}
=
B∑
j=1
I(Xn1j ; Yˆ
n
rj|Xn2j),
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where (a) follows removing conditioning and the fact that the second term in (19) is zero since Xn2j is a de-
terministic function of Yˆ nr,j−1, X2,j−1; (b) follows the fact that Yˆ nrj−{Xn1j , Xn2j}−{Yˆ (j−1)nr , X(j−1)n2 , Xn1,]j[}
is a Markov chain, since the channel is memoryless and the codebook for each block is independently
generated. Besides, the fifth term can be upper bounded as
I(XBn1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r ; Y
Bn
2 ) =
B∑
j=1
I(XBn1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r ; Y
n
2j|Y (j−1)n2 )
≤
B∑
j=1
{H(Y n2j)−H(Y n2j|XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr , Y (j−1)n2 )}
(a)
=
B∑
j=1
{H(Y n2j)−H(Y n2j|Xn1j, Xn2j , Yˆ nrj}
=
B∑
j=1
I(Xn1j , X
n
2j, Yˆ
n
rj; Y
n
2j),
where (a) follows from the fact that Y n2j−{Xn1j , Xn2j, Yˆ nrj}−{Y (j−1)n2 , Xn1]j[, Xn2]j[, Yˆ nr]j[} is a Markov chain.
Using the above two results, we can bound the sum of above two terms as
S4,5 = I(X
Bn
1 ;X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r ) + I(X
Bn
1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r ; Y
Bn
2 )
≤
B∑
j=1
[I(Xn1j ; Yˆ
n
rj|Xn2j) + I(Xn1j , Xn2j, Yˆ nrj; Y n2j)]
=
B∑
j=1
[I(Xn1j , X
n
2j; Y
n
2j) + I(Yˆ
n
rj;X
n
1j , Y
n
2j|Xn2j)]
≤
B∑
j=1
n[I(X1, X2; Y2) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2) + δ2(n)].
On the other hand,
S4,5 ≤
B∑
j=1
[I(Xn1j ; Yˆ
n
rj|Xn2j) + I(Xn1j, Xn2j , Yˆ nrj; Y n2j)]
=
B∑
j=1
[I(Xn1j ; Yˆ
n
rj, Y
n
2j|Xn2j) + I(Xn2j , Yˆ nrj; Y n2j)]
≤
B∑
j=1
[I(Xn1j ; Yˆ
n
rj, Y
n
2j|Xn2j) +H(Xn2j)]
≤
B∑
j=1
n[I(X1; Yˆr, Y2|X2) +R2 + δ2(n)].
Therefore, we have
S4,5 ≤ nB(R1,o +R2) + nB(ǫ1 + δ2(n)), (20)
where R1,o is defined in (12).
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4) The last term: Now let’s bound the last term H(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr |W1, Y Bn2 , LB). Fix W1 = w1 and
LB = lb, and assume that the source sends a codeword x1j(w1, w′1) and the relay transmits x2j(lj−1) at
each block j ∈ [1 : B]. Since XBn1 is determined by two indices w1, w′1 and (XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr ) are determined
by B indices (l1, · · · , lB), the eavesdropper only needs to do joint decoding of w′1 and (l1, · · · , lB−1) at
the end of block B with the side information that W1 = w1 and LB = lb. Specifically, for any ǫ > ǫ′,
given W1 = w1 and LB = lB , the eavesdropper finds the unique index set {wˆ′1, lˆ1, · · · , lˆB−1} such that
(x1j(w1, wˆ
′
1),x2j(lˆj−1), yˆrj(lˆj |lˆj−1),y2j) ∈ T (n)ǫ for all j ∈ [1 : B]. The eavesdropper make an error if
there exists none or more than one such index set.
Analysis of the error probability: Given W1 = w1 and LB = lB , assume without loss of generality that
W ′1 = 1 and L1 = · · · = LB = 1 are sent. Then the eavesdropper makes an error only if at least one of
the following events occur:
ε1 = {(Yˆrj(lj|1),X2j(1),Yrj) 6∈ T (n)ǫ′ for all lj ∈ [1 : 2nR2 ] for some j ∈ [1 : B]}
ε2 = {(X1j(w1, 1),X2j(1), Yˆrj(1|1),Y2j) 6∈ T (n)ǫ for some j ∈ [1 : B]}
ε3 = {(X1j(w1, w′1),X2j(lj−1), Yˆrj(lj|lj−1),Y2j) ∈ T (n)ǫ for all j for some lB−1, w′1 6= 1}
ε4 = {(X1j(w1, 1),X2j(lj−1), Yˆrj(lj |lj−1),Y2j) ∈ T (n)ǫ for all j for some lB−1 6= 1B−1}
Thus the error probability can be bounded as
P (ε) = P (ε ∩ ε1) + P (ε ∩ εc1)
= P (ε ∩ ε1) + P ((ε2 ∪ ε3 ∪ ε4) ∩ εc1)
= P (ε ∩ ε1) + P ((ε2 ∩ εc1) ∪ (ε3 ∩ εc1) ∪ (ε4 ∩ εc1))
≤ P (ε1) + P (ε2 ∩ εc1) + P (ε3 ∩ εc1) + P (ε4 ∩ εc1)
≤ P (ε1) + P (ε2∩εc1) + P (ε3) + P (ε4). (21)
From [19], one can see that the first three terms goes to 0 as n→∞ since we have constrained the rate
pair (R2, R1,o) in (11) and (12). For P (ε4), define the events
ε˜j(1, lj−1, lj) = {(X1j(w1, 1),X2j(lj−1), Yˆrj(lj|lj−1),Y2j) ∈ T (n)ǫ },
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and then
P (ε4) = P (∪lB−1 6=1B−1 ∩Bj=1 ε˜j(1, lj−1, lj))
≤
∑
lB−1 6=1B−1
P (∩Bj=1ε˜j(1, lj−1, lj))
(a)
=
∑
lB−1 6=1B−1
B∏
j=1
P (ε˜j(1, lj−1, lj))
≤
∑
lB−1 6=1B−1
B∏
j=2
P (ε˜j(1, lj−1, lj)), (22)
where (a) is due to the fact that the codebook at each block j ∈ [1 : b] is independently generated and
the memoryless channel is considered. Note that if w′1 = 1 and lj−1 6= 1, (X2j(lj−1), Yˆrj(lj |lj−1)) ∼∏n
i=1 pX2,Yˆr(x2,(j−1)n+i, yˆr,(j−1)n+i) is independent of (X1j(w1, 1),Y2j). So by the joint typicality lemma
( [20], Lecture Note 2), for w′1 = 1 and lj−1 6= 1,
P (ε˜j(1, lj−1, lj)) = P
(
(X1j(w1, 1),X2j(lj−1), Yˆrj(lj|lj−1),Y2j) ∈ T (n)ǫ
)
=
∑
(x1j ,x2j ,yˆrj ,y2j)∈T
(n)
ǫ
p(x2j , yˆrj)p(x1j ,y2j)
≤ |T (n)ǫ |2−n(H(X2,Yˆr)−ǫH(X2,Yˆr))2−n(H(X1,Y2)−ǫH(X1,Y2))
≤ 2−n(H(X1,Y2)+H(X2,Yˆr)−H(X1,X2,Yˆr,Y2)−δ(ǫ))
= 2−n(I3−δ(ǫ)), (23)
where I3 = I(X2, Yˆr;X1, Y2) = I(X2; Y2|X1)+I(Yˆr;X1Y2|X2). If conditioned on that the binary sequence
lB−1 has k(k ∈ [1 : B − 2]) 1s, from the above result we have
B∏
j=2
P (ε˜j(1, lj−1, lj)) ≤ 2−n(B−1−k)(I3−δ(ǫ)). (24)
Hence substitute the above result to (22) and obtain
P (ε4) ≤
∑
lB−1 6=1B−1
B∏
j=2
P (ε˜j(1, lj−1, lj))
≤
B−2∑
k=0

B − 1
k

 2n(B−1−k)R22−n(B−1−k)(I3−δ(ǫ))
=
B−1∑
i=1

B − 1
i

 2−nia0 ,
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where i = B − 1 − k and a0 = I3 − R2 − δ(ǫ). Note that a0 > 0 since Case I is considered here. Let
ui =

B − 1
k

 2−nia0 , then
ui+1
ui
=
B − 1− i
i+ 1
2−na0 ≤ (B/2− 1)2−na0 ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ B − 2. Hence ui ≤ u1((B/2 − 1)2−na0)i−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ B − 1, where u1 = (B − 1)2−na0 .
Therefore
P (ǫ4) ≤ (B − 1)2−na0
B−1∑
i=1
((B/2− 1)2−na0)i−1 ≤ (B − 1)2
−na0
1− (B/2− 1)2−na0 .
Therefore, the error probability P (ǫ) goes to 0 if n is sufficiently large. From Fano’s inequality, we have
1
nB
H(XBn1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r |W1 = w1, LB = lB, Y Bn2 )
≤ 1
nB
(
1 + P (ǫ) log(|W ′1| × |LB−1|)
)
≤ 1
nB
(
1 + P (ǫ)(log 2nBR1,o + (B − 1) log 2nR2))
=
1
nB
+ P (ǫ)
(
R1,o +
B − 1
B
R2
)
= δ3(n). (25)
Thus the last term can be bounded as
1
nB
H(XBn1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r |W1, Y Bn2 , LB)
=
∑
w1,lB
p(w1, lB)H(X
Bn
1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r |W1 = w1, LB = lB, Y Bn2 )
≤ δ3(n). (26)
By combining (13) with (14), (18), (20) and (26), we get
1
nB
H(W1|Y Bn2 ) ≥ R1,s −
R2
B
− 2δ(ǫ′)− δ1(n)− ǫ1 − δ2(n)− δ3(n). (27)
By letting B →∞, the equivocation is approaching to the secrecy rate.
B. Case II:
(
R2 ≥ I(X2; Y2|X1) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2)
)
This proof can be completed by following the similar steps in Case I and [16]. First the rate parameter
for R1,o is chosen as
R1,o = I(X1; Y2)− ǫ1. (28)
To prove the rate for CASE II, the relay uses a similar binning procedure as the the source. For each
j ∈ [1 : B], the 2nR2 codewords are randomly grouped into 2nR′2 bins each with 2nR′′2 codewords, hence
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R2 = R
′
2 +R
′′
2 . So that the index of each codeword can be equivalently expressed as lj = (l′j, l′′j ), where
l′j ∈ [1 : 2nR′2], l′′j ∈ [1 : 2nR′′2 ]. To simplify the proof, we set
R′′2 = I(X2; Y2|X1) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2)− ǫ2. (29)
Then following the steps in (13) and let (L′)B−1 = {L′1, · · · , L′B−1}, the equivocation can be bounded as
H(W1|Y Bn2 ) ≥ H(W1|Y Bn2 , LB, (L′)B−1) (30)
≥ H(XBn1 )−H(LB, (L′)B−1) +H(XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr )− I(XBn1 ;XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr )
−I(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr ; Y Bn2 )−H(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr |W1, Y Bn2 , LB, (L′)B−1),
where H(XBn1 ) = nB(R1,s +R1,o), H(XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr ) ≥ nBR2 − nB(2δ(ǫ′) + δ1(n)) as shown in (18). The
second term can be bounded as
H(LB, (L
′)B−1) ≤ H(LB) +
B−1∑
j=1
H(L′j) ≤ nR2 + n(B − 1)R′2.
Besides, from (20), the sum of the fourth and the fifth terms is
S4,5 = I(X
Bn
1 ;X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r ) + I(X
Bn
1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r ; Y
Bn
2 )
≤ nB[I(X1, X2; Y2) + I(Yˆr;X1, Y2|X2) + δ2(n)].
= nB[R1,o +R
′′
2 + ǫ1 + ǫ2 + δ2(n)]. (31)
To bound the last term H(XBn1 , XBn2 , Yˆ Bnr |W1, Y Bn2 , LB, (L′)B−1), the eavesdropper only needs to do
joint decoding of W ′1 and {L′′1, · · · , L′′B} at the end of block B assuming that W1, LB and (L′)B−1 are given
to it as side information. Similar to the analysis of the last term in Case I, for the rates (R2, R1,o, R′′2)
constrained in (11), (28) and (29), it can be shown that the error probability is arbitrarily small for
sufficiently large n. Hence we have
1
nB
H(XBn1 , X
Bn
2 , Yˆ
Bn
r |W1, Y Bn2 , LB, (L′)B−1) ≤ δ3(n).
Substituting the above results into (30), the equivocation can be bounded as
1
nB
H(W1|Y Bn2 ) ≥ R1,s −
R′′2
B
− 2δ(ǫ′)− δ1(n)− ǫ1 − ǫ2 − δ2(n)− δ3(n). (32)
Again by letting B →∞, we can show that the equivocation is approaching the secrecy rate.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
To upper bound the conditional probability mass function p(lj |lj−1) for any j ∈ [1 : B] and lj−1, lj ∈
[1 : 2nR2 ], we first make some useful definitions as follows.
• Given Lj−1 = lj−1, define 2nR2 binary random variables as
Qk,lj−1 =


1, if {(Yˆrj(k|lj−1),Yrj,X2j(lj−1)) ∈ T (n)ǫ′ |Lj−1 = lj−1}
0, if {(Yˆrj(k|lj−1),Yrj,X2j(lj−1)) 6∈ T (n)ǫ′ |Lj−1 = lj−1}
,
where k ∈ [1 : 2nR2]. Define a new random variable as Tlj−1 =
∑2nR2
k=1 Qk,lj−1 , which represents that
there are Tlj−1 qualified indexes in the 2nR2 yˆrj-codewords. From the joint typicality ( [20], Lecture
Note 2), for sufficiently large n the probability P (Qk,lj−1 = 1) can be bounded as:
(1− ǫ′)2−n(I1+δ(ǫ′)) ≤ P (Qk,lj−1 = 1) ≤ 2−n(I1−δ(ǫ
′)), (33)
where I1 = I(Yˆr; Yr|X2). The expectation of Tlj−1 can be expressed as E(Tlj−1) =
∑2nR2
k=1 P (Qk,lj−1 =
1), so it can be bounded as
(1− ǫ′)2n(R2−I1−δ(ǫ′)) ≤ E(Tlj−1) ≤ 2n(R2−I1+δ(ǫ
′)). (34)
• Let Lj,lj−1 ∼ pLj |Lj−1(lj|lj−1), i.e. Lj,lj−1 ∼ p(lj |lj−1). Similar to the definitions in [20] (Lecture
Note 4), we can identify the random variables Lj := Lj,Lj−1 , Qk := Qk,Lj−1 and T := TLj−1 , whose
distributions depend on Lj−1 in the same way as the distributions of Lj,lj−1 , Qk,lj−1 and Tlj−1 depend
on lj−1. From the encoding process, given Lj−1 = lj−1, conditioned on that there are t(t > 0)
qualified indexes and lj is one of them (i.e. Qlj ,lj−1 = 1), obviously we have
P{Lj,lj−1 = lj |Qlj ,lj−1 = 1, Tlj−1 = t} =
1
t
. (35)
Similarly, given Lj−1 = lj−1, we can obtain another conditional probability as
P{Lj,lj−1 = lj|Qlj ,lj−1 = 0, Tlj−1 = t} = 0, for t > 0. (36)
Let M = 1
2
E(Tlj−1) which is assumed to be an integer without loss of generality, then the probability
p(lj|lj−1) can be calculated as
p(lj |lj−1) = P (Lj,Lj−1 = lj |Lj−1 = lj−1) = P (Lj,lj−1 = lj)
=
2nR2∑
t=0
P ({Lj,lj−1 = lj} ∩ {Tlj−1 = t})
=
M−1∑
t=0
P ({Lj,lj−1 = lj} ∩ {Tlj−1 = t}) +
2nR2∑
t=M
P ({Lj,lj−1 = lj} ∩ {Tlj−1 = t}). (37)
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The first term in the above equation can be bounded as
M−1∑
t=0
P ({Lj,lj−1 = lj} ∩ {Tlj−1 = t}) ≤
M−1∑
t=0
P (Tlj−1 = t)
= P (Tlj−1 < M)
(a)
≤ exp
{
−E(Tlj−1)
8
}
≤ exp{−(1− ǫ′)2n(R2−I1−δ(ǫ′))−3}, (38)
where (a) is based on the multiplicative form of Chernoff bound ( Eq. (7) in [21]) by setting the relative
error as 1
2
. Besides, the second term can be upper bounded as
2nR2∑
t=M
P ({Lj,lj−1 = lj} ∩ {Tlj−1 = t}) =
2nR2∑
t=M
1∑
i=0
P ({Lj,lj−1 = lj} ∩ {Tlj−1 = t} ∩ {Qlj ,lj−1 = i})
=
2nR2∑
t=M
1∑
i=0
P (Qlj ,lj−1 = i, Tlj−1 = t)P (Lj,lj−1 = lj |Qlj ,lj−1 = i, Tlj−1 = t)
(a)
=
2nR2∑
t=M
1
t
P (Qlj ,lj−1 = 1, Tlj−1 = t)
≤ 2
E(Tlj−1)
P (Qlj ,lj−1 = 1)
(b)
≤ 1
(1− ǫ′)2
−n(R2−2δ(ǫ′))+1, (39)
where (a) is based on (35) and (36), (b) is based on (33) and (34). Substituting the above two results
into (37) concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Based on the coding scheme in Appendix A, C1 and C2 are generated by letting the distributions π as
X1 ∼ N (0, P1), X2 ∼ N (0, P2), Yˆr = Yr+ZC where ZC ∼ N (0, δC) and ZC is independent of any other
variable. Assuming the fixed power pair (P1, P2) is used, here we only discuss the coding parameters R2
and δC . From (4), R(1)1 (R2, δC) and R(2)1 (R2, δC) can be calculated as
R
(1)
1 (R2, δC) = max
{[
C
(
P1 +
cP1
1 + δC
)
, C(P1 + bP2) + C
(
cP1
1 + δC
)
− R2
]
, C
(
P1
1 + bP2
)}
R
(2)
1 (R2, δC) = max
{[
C
(
aP1 +
cP1
1 + δC
)
, C(aP1 + P2) + C
(
cP1
1 + δC
)
−R2
]
, C
(
aP1
1 + P2
)}
.
Next, we can observe that one achievable choice of RIS is to set δC = δ∗C with δ∗C =
1+(1+c)P1
bP2
and
R2 = R
∗
2 with R∗2 = max
{
C
(
1+cP1
δ∗
C
)
, C(P2) + C
(
cP1
1+δ∗
C
)}
. In this case,
R
(1)
1 (R
∗
2, δ
∗
C) = max
{
C(P1 + bP2) + C
(
cP1
1 + δ∗C
)
−R∗2, C
(
P1
1 + bP2
)}
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and R(2)1 (R∗2, δ∗C) = C
(
aP1
1+P2
)
can be obtained.
1) When b ≥ 1 + (1 + c)P1: δ∗C ≤ 1P2 , we have R∗2 = C
(
1+cP1
δ∗
C
)
. Then we calculate R(1)1 =
C
(
P1 +
cP1
1+δ∗
C
)
. And the secrecy rate Rs = R(1)1 − R(2)1 = C
(
P1 +
bcP1P2
1+(1+c)P1+bP2
)
− C
(
aP1
1+P2
)
can
be obtained.
2) When 1 ≤ b < 1 + (1 + c)P1: 1P2 ≤ δ∗C <
1+(1+c)P1
P2
, we have R∗2 = C(P2) + C
(
cP1
1+δ∗
C
)
. Then
R
(1)
1 can be calculated as R
(1)
1 = C(P1 + bP2) − C(P2). So the secrecy rate is Rs = R(1)1 − R(2)1 =
C(P1 + bP2)− C(aP1 + P2).
3) When b ≤ 1: δ∗C ≥ 1+(1+c)P1P2 , we have R∗2 = C(P2) + C
(
cP1
1+δ∗
C
)
. Then R(1)1 can be calculated as
R
(1)
1 = C
(
P1
1+bP2
)
. So the secrecy rate is Rs = C
(
P1
1+bP2
)
− C
(
aP1
1+P2
)
.
On the other hand, RIIs = [C(P1)− C(aP1)]+ can be achieved by setting δC =∞ and R2 = 0, which
may yield a higher secrecy rate under certain conditions. Hence max{RIs , RIIs } can be achieved and the
proof of Theorem 2 is finished.
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